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In light of recent drastic changes in national security concerns, new systems are
being considered for future mihtary implementation. One of the major systems under
consideration by the Advanced Research Projects Agency is the Mobile Offshore
Base (MOB). The MOB entails essentially two to six self-propelled, floating
platforms that are cormected and used for military presence and/or war-fighting
purposes. This thesis examines the question of whether the MOB should legally be
considered a warship, a merchant vessel, or structure/installation. This question is
important for the answer implies where on the ocean and under what circumstances
the placement ofthe system complies with international law. After a brief review of
the national policy with respect to presence and the problem of reduced access to
overseas bases, the thesis examines the legal implications of the MOB. The legal
analysis starts with the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) that
entered into force December 16, 1994. Gaps in UNCLOS definitions and policy are
explained by general concepts of intemational law and, where needed, municipal law.
The thesis concludes the MOB should be considered a ship and should be given
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In light of recent drastic changes in national
security concerns, new systems are being considered for
future military implementation. One of the major systems
under consideration by the Advanced Research Projects Agency
is the Mobile Offshore Base (MOB) . The MOB entails
essentially two to six self-propelled, floating platforms
connected and used for military presence and/or war-fighting
purposes. This thesis examines the question of whether the
MOB should legally be considered a warship, a merchant
vessel, or structure/installation. This question is
important for the answer determines where on the ocean and
under what circumstances the placement of the system
complies with international law.
After a brief explanation of the origins of the MOB
concept and a working physical description in Chapter I,
Chapter II reviews the national policy with respect to
presence and the problem of reduced access to overseas
bases. The general conclusion of this chapter is that since
World War II, access to overseas bases has declined and has
adversely affected the manner in which US forces conduct
presence operations. One proposed solution to this problem
is the MOB.
Chapter III briefly outlines some possible MOB missions
as perceived by some proponents of this project. Chapter IV
IX
is the central core of research of this thesis. The legal
analysis starts with the United Nations Law of the Sea
Convention (UNCLOS) that entered force December 16, 1994.
The main points of this section are to explain the UNCLOS
demarcation regime and to determine the definitions of
artificial islands, installations and structures under
UNCLOS. Gaps in UNCLOS definitions and policy are explained
by general concepts of international law and, where needed,
municipal law.
The final Chapter outlines the dispute resolution
system established by UNCLOS in a discussion to evaluate
where the MOB may be legally anchored offshore, plus a final
argument whether the MOB should be considered a ship or
structure. The thesis concludes that the MOB should clearly
be considered a ship under international law and, as such,
should be able to anchor anywhere beyond the 12 nautical
mile territorial sea of any country. Further, the thesis
argues the MOB should be given warship status by the United
States government.
I. INTRODUCTION.
The demise of the Soviet Union has called into question
the future uses and utility of the US military. Does the
Nation still need the large forces that were built during
the Cold War? Many believe the answer is no, the military
should be reduced. The next critical question is, what
should the military look like in the post-Cold war era?
Alternatives range from smaller force structure similar to
the existing one, to a radically revised and "restructured"
force structure that takes advantage of technology
associated with the current revolution in military affairs.
In truth, many of these and related questions were being
asked before the fall of the of the Soviet Union, notably as
part of the work of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term
Strategy (the Weinberger Commission).^
Although still primarily concerned with the. Soviet
threat, the Commission envisioned a substantially altered
future US security environment. The Report proposed, among
other things, that "China, perhaps Japan and other
countries" will become military powers with their
increasing economies and populations. It went on to caution
that lesser countries will obtain advanced weaponry, that
major US interests will be threatened "at fronts much closer
^The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO] , 1988).
to our adversaries than the US," and that military
technology will "change substantially in the next 20
years. "^ One of the six factors the Commission claimed
would alter the future security environment was the
deteriorating US access to overseas areas. It said.
The United States must develop alternatives to
overseas bases [,].. .especially against possible Soviet
aggression. . .But we should not ordinarily be dependent
on bases in defending our interests in the Third World.
We have found it increasingly difficult, and
politically costly, to maintain bases there. -^
The report enumerated other areas of the world where,
regardless of the Soviet menace, a US military presence was
required to protect national and allied interests. One
significant aspect of the overall long-term strategy
advocated by the Commission cited the need for,
" [v] ersatile, mobile forces, minimally dependent on overseas
bases, that can deliver precisely controlled strikes against
distant military targets.'"'
Apart from the formal policy documents and political
consensus strategies, the realities of the post Cold-War
situation is that US military access, whether access only or
actual physical presence, is declining. Additionally, in
light of terrorist acts and host nation political or




access is highly likely.^ A significant motivation for the
Weinberger Commission was the 1983 bombing of the Marine
barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. In 1988, the United States was
asked to remove some, although not all, of its bases in
Spain, Pakistan, and Thailand.^ In the wake of the recent
terrorist bombing in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, the United States
is reconsidering the extent of its forward deployed forces
in the Middle East.^ The recent trend has been towards
limiting or reducing access to overseas bases and not
continuing or increasing that access.
This thesis examines the problem of declining US
overseas access and forward presence issues by exploring the
international legal ramifications of one proposed solution:
the Mobile Offshore Base (MOB) concept. These ramifications
depend, in part, on the legal definition of the proposed
system. This thesis attempts to answer the question whether
the MOB should be considered a warship, a merchant ship, or
a structure.
A. BRIEF MOB DESCRIPTION.
The MOB'S principal proponent, the former Vice-Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) Admiral William Owens
(ret.), has described the system as taking advantage of "the
William R. Doerner, "Growing Troubles for US Bases; High Costs and Inhospitable
Hosts hamper Installations Abroad," Time, February 1, 1988, p. 33.
^Ibid.
Christopher Dickey, "Target America," Newsweek, July 8, 1996, pp. 22-26. see also
Jason Glashow, "US Debates Arms Prepositioning in UAE," Defense News, June 19, 1995, p.
18, for an explanation of Middle East requirements versus war-fighting capabilities in
the theater.
experience and technology associated with offshore oil-
drilling platforms'''' by connecting two to six floating
modules together to form a floating ^'island. "^ Each module
would be approximately 500 feet long, 300 feet wide, and 200
feet high.^ The MOB may be thought of as the afloat
equivalent of Washington D.C.'s National Airport. According
to a proposal by Brown & Root, a MOB would consist of two to
six modules with vertical support columns 500 feet long, 312
feet wide, and 213 feet from keel to flight deck.^° Each
module would have 450,000 square feet of below decks storage
space. ^-^ The system would be anchored and kept in constant
geo-position with thruster units with the ability to detach
each module and maneu"^'er slowly (under 8 knots) , if
necessary. ^^ An alternative proposal from the Norwegian
firm of Kvaerner-Moss involves what is essentially an oil
platform "7,750 feet long with a 425 foot wide platform
capable of supporting C-17 operations . "^^
The central purpose of the MOB scheme is to provide for
a US overseas power projection capability without the
potentially entangling encumbrance of a land base on foreign
ADMIRAL William A. Owens, High Seas: The Naval Passage to an Uncharted World,
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995) p. 10 (hereinafter Owens, High Seas).
See also Robert Holzer, "^Floating Island' Concept Gains Support in U.S.
Military," Defense News April 18-24, 1994.
Defense News. See Appendix 1 for Brown & Root Mobile Offshore Bases
information sheet and pictures.
"Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ADMIRAL W.A. Owens letter to President,
National Defense University, Ser CM-466-94, 22 September 1994, Enclosure 2.
Logistics Management Institute, Concept of Operations : Mobile Offshore Base
(MOB) for the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) , 14 February 1995, p. 2.
'^Ibid, p. 3.
Logistics Management Institute, Concept of Operation: Mobile Offshore Base
(MOB) for the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) , 14 February 1995, p. 3.
territory. The system's advocates propose that the MOB
modules would travel to an uncontested area of the ocean and
be assembled to provide logistics, command and control, and
a forward presence capability to the theater commander. On-
station arrival times would be computed based on a nominal
6-10 knot speed of advance for each module. On-station
assembly and commencement of operations times would vary
with mission and location, but the fastest expectation would
be four days to begin operations once the MOB was on-
station.
The question of what would the MOB replace - bases or
aircraft carriers - has been answered by the recent issuance
of a Mission Needs Statement (MNS) calling for a large sea-
based structure to replace land bases. -^^ For the purposes
of this thesis, the MOB will be discussed in very general
terms. The objective is to arrive at a legal assessment
that can support either manifestation of the MOB, i.e., as a
war fighting platform, or, as a logistics hub. In other
words, this thesis addresses the question whether the MOB
should be treated as a warship, a merchant vessel, or a
structure. The answer is important because the legal status
^^
"US Navy Asks for Offshore Base Concepts," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 24,
1996, p. 4. For a discussion of the issues See, Michael R. Gordon, "Admiral With
High-Tech Dreams Has Pentagon at War With Itself," New York Times, 12 December
1994, p. 1, Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, Vice Chief of Naval Operations rejected
the MOB concept because it was a "poor substitute for an aircraft carrier because
of its limited mobility." See also Robert Holzer, "" Floating Island' Concept
Gains Support in the US Military," Defense News, April 18, 1994, p. 10, quoting
Scott Truver of Techmatics Inc, that the MOB is "not an aircraft carrier. It is
an alternative to land bases in such places as Subic Bay and Diego Garcia."
of the MOB defines where it can be placed in the ocean.
Chapter I introduces and defines the issue. Chapter II
discusses the background regarding the forward presence and
overseas basing issues of future force requirements.
Chapter III opens a brief discussion of possible MOB
missions. Chapter IV explores international and admiralty
law to determine the most advantageous legal position for
the United States Government regarding the legal character
of the MOB. The spectrum of international rights and
responsibilities ranges from a warship that has extremely
broad immunities from interference to a structure that is
tightly controlled by the coastal state with the fluid
position of merchant ships falling somewhere between the
two. Chapter V presents arguments for and against placement
of the MOB, and concludes by proposing the United States
government should adopt the position that the MOB should be
considered a warship for international law purposes.
I I. FORWARD PRESENCE AND OVERSEAS BASING BACKGROUND ISSUES.
This chapter outlines US presence policy and the
development of the MOB concept.
A. CURRENT POLICY.
The Clinton administration issued its current statement
on national security policy in July 1996.^^ It proposes
three pillars of US National Security Strategy: (1) enhance
national security, (2) promote prosperity at home, and (3)
promote prosperity abroad. In support of the first pillar,
the document states the United States will maintain a strong
defense capability. In order to maintain this defense
capability, the military is asked to accomplish major five
tasks: (1) deal with major regional contingencies (MRCs),
(2) provide a credible overseas presence, (3) counter
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), (4) aid multilateral
peace operations, and (5) support other selected national
security objectives . -^^ The MOB concept primarily concerns
the second task of providing a credible overseas presence.
However, it can be used to support other aspects of the
policy as well. In an era of declining overseas access and
dwindling political will to permanently station forces
overseas, planners are forced to explore alternative ways to
'a National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington, D.C.: U.S,
Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO] , February 1996).
'*Ibid, p. 13.
execute the National Security Strategy. The MOB is one
option under consideration.
The National Military Strategy of the United States
highlights forward presence as a foundation of US policy.
It claims: "the day-to-day presence of US forces in regions
vital to US national interests has been key to averting
crises and preventing war."^'' Strategic agility and power
projection are critical to the presence mission.
Additionally, The Bottom-Up Review^ s conclusions are
descriptive regarding the need for US overseas presence . •'^
The document's general conclusion is that the United States
will continue to deploy forces overseas in order to,
"protect and advance our interests and perform a wide range
of functions that contribute to our security . "-^^ For
example, in South Korea, the United States will continue to
deploy troops and pre-position equipment as, "long as its
people want and need us there. "^^ In Southwest Asia the
problem is different. Here, "local sensitivities" to Europe
or South Korea-like troop deployments prevent routine
stationing of forces. In Southwest Asia the. US military
relies on periodic deployments of naval forces to maintain a
presence
.
'^rhe National Military Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO] , January 1992), p. 7.
" Secretary of the Navy Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom Up Review, {Washington,
D.C: October 1993)
.
Ibid, p. 14, See also James A. Lasswell, COL, USMC, Presence - Do We Stay Or Do
We Go? Joint Forces Quarterly fSummer 1995) p. 84 (hereinafter Lasswell, Stay or
Go?) .
A seminal defense planning exercise, that still affects
post-Soviet U.S. defense planning, was the work of the
Weinberger Commission. In 1988, the Weinberger Commission
was formed to review US military strategy for the next 20
years, ^'to guide force deployment, weapons procurement, and
arms negotiations."^-^ The Commission's conclusions are used
as an outline to discuss presence issues; they are supported
by updated sources where available.
The Commission recognized the United States must
preserve the ability to project power beyond our shores and
maintain an overseas presence. It stated:
The United States has critical interests in the
continuing autonomy of some allies very distant to us-
in Europe and the Mediterranean, in the Middle East and
Southwest Asia, in East Asia and the Pacific, and in
the Western Hemisphere. We use bases, ports, and air
space in helping these allies defend themselves and one
another .^^
B. CONDUCT OF PRESENCE.
Presence is not a new issue. In addition to addressing
future military strategy, the report of the Weinberger
Commission is an excellent source document for understanding
how the United States has practiced presence. The report
noted how a key component of US military strategy had been
the "forward deployment of American forces. "^^ Forward
^^Discriminate Deterrence, p. 1.
^^Ibid, p. 63; See Lasswell, Stay Or Go? pp. 83-85, for an excellent discussion
of overseas presence to support the National Security Strategy to maintain a
liberal free world economy.
"ibid, p. 5.
deployment or presence, has historically been heavily
dependent on the availability of overseas bases on foreign
territory.^'' Although the Commission's findings were
couched in Cold War rhetoric, they recognized that the
availability to United States forces of overseas staging
areas for power projection served purposes other than
countering the Soviet military menace alone. The report
stated:
The United States will continue to need bases because
the need will remain to deter or defeat aggressors at
distant points overseas - typically at distant points much
closer to our adversaries than to us.^^
In the past, the United States exercised presence by
forward deployment of troops and material to bases on
foreign soil. The general policy has been to fight wars
beyond the territorial borders of the United States. One
obstacle to continuing this policy is declining access to
foreign bases.
C. DECLINING ACCESS TO FOREIGN BASES.
Since "[n] early all the armed conflicts of the past 40
years have occurred in what is vaguely referred to as the
^''Robert E. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989) pp. 2-4, citing Thucydides, Admirals Mahan
and Gorshkov and W.W.II "lessons learned;" See also David S. Yost, The Future of
U.S. Overseas Presence, Joint Forces Quarterly (Sximmer 1995) p. 70 (hereinafter
Yost, Overseas Presence)
.
Ibid. A particularly illuminating pictorial representation of this problem is
on pp. 24-25 of Discriminate Deterrence. In the 1950' s, the Soviet had virtually
no airfield and overflight capability to project power to the Persian Gulf and
the U.S. had almost unlimited access. The U.S. logistics shipping distance was
990 MM while the Soviets needed to move supplies over 13,000 NM. By 1987 the
U.S. was seriously limited in access to bases and overflight rights moving
supplies 6540 NM while the Soviets shortened their distance to 725 NM.
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Third World, "^^ the Weinberger Commission emphasized this
area as the locus of a integrated long-term strategy. The
Commission found that, "[o]ne long term trend unfavorable to
the United States concerns our diminishing ability to gain
agreement for timely access, including bases and overflight
rights, to areas threatened by Soviet aggression. "^'^ The
Regional Conflict Working Group of the Weinberger Commission
predicted that "Presidents in the first decade of the next
century may have to [act with military force] without many
of the overseas bases that have underwritten the strategy of
the United States in the Third World for most of the 20th
Century. "^^ The Future Security Environment Working Group
predicted two serious consequences if access to overseas
bases were to be lost.^^ First, the loss of access would
result in the need for more expensive weapon systems, for
example, a greater number of more expensive satellites.
Next, the absence of bases would probably force a
restructuring of US armed forces to ^'seize and hold forward
bases from the enemy or other powers in the event of war."^°
The Commission recommended that, given the
^*The Coitraiission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Regional Conflict Working
Group, Supporting U.S. Strategy for the Third World Conflict, (Washington, D.C.
:
U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO] , June 1988, p. 1 (hereinafter Third
World Conflict) .
^^Discriminate Deterrence, p. 10; See also, George Galdorisi, CAPT, USN, The
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A National Security Perspective,
89 American Journal of International Law 208 (1995) p. 209.
^Third World Conflict, p. 13.
^^The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Future Security Environment
Working Group, The Future Security Environment, (Washington, D.C: U.S.
Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], October 1988), pp. 59-60.
^°Ibid.
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vulnerabilities of future foreign basing rights, "[t]he
United States must develop alternatives to overseas
bases. "^-^ Over the years, various technical solutions have
been suggested.
D. TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS.
In May 1988, The BDM Corporation issued a study
prepared for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) , entitled Technological Alternatives to Bases
Overseas (TABO).^^ BDM was tasked to review various
technological alternatives and provide a prioritized list of
suggested actions for DARPA.
Technological alternatives were outlined in six major
categories: (1) air platforms ^ including aircraft, airships,
cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) ; (2)
materials and structures , including tents made from Kevlar
and advanced insulating material; (3) airfields at sea,
semi-submersible mobile operating base, mobile operational
large island, offshore platforms, and integrated supership
system; (4) advanced shipping^ such as wing-in-ground
effect (WIG) and surface effect ships (SES) ; (5) force
configuration^ e.g., containerize forces and adapt/tailor
Task Organization and Elements (TO&E) for base availability
"ibid, p. 22; See also Yost, Overseas Presence, pp. 70-82, "It might be
desirable to increase investment in maritime prepositioning and to investigate
the potential merits of dispersed "transitory, " low-cost facilities as well as
the sustainability of defenses for a smaller number of permanent bases." p. 78.
"The BDM Corporation, Technical Alternatives to Bases Overseas (TABO) , Prepared
for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, May 1988.
12
and mission; (6) C3J, integrate existing and future C3I
systems to reduce the need for overseas presence by enhanced
surveillance
.
The TABO report found that the Nation' s present sea and
airlift capacity was woefully inadequate, but that, "users
assume lift will be there." Significant deficiencies in
lift capacity were noted in terms of the strength of power
projection (measured in number of troops or ships) and the
distance of the power projection from the continental United
States (CONUS) . The strength of power projection sharply
decreased in direct relation to the distance from CONUS.
The further away from CONUS the military was attempting to
send forces significantly decreased the strength of the
power projection. In addition, most Third World ports were
thought inadequate for military use.
The TABO report recommended the first priority for
DARPA consideration be the exploitation of airfield at sea
technologies. A two pronged research strategy was
recommended. First, DARPA was urged to compare the floating
platform concept versus the "island" of very large ships.
Simply, the MOB concept in its seminal stage was a series of
floating, oil-drilling platforms bolted together, whereas,
the other option was a very large crude carrying (VLCC) ship
that can anchor or moor near geo-political hot spots to
provide fuel and communications capability. The TABO report
next urged that the CinCs assess strategic mobility trade-
13
of f S -
Since the publication of the TABO report, DARPA has
acquired technical information comparing floating platforms
and islands of very large ships. Also, the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has reviewed the
technical and planning data. Early in 1996, the JROC issued
the MNS for the MOB. The next step in the research strategy
proposed by TABO is to assess proposals within the technical
parameters outlined in the MNS.
14
III. MOB MISSIONS.
This chapter outlines the possible missions and
characteristics of a MOB. Although the MOB concept has
generated much interest, very little substantive commentary
can be found in the open press. There are two possible
reasons for this situation. First, the concept has only
very recently been articulated by the recently retired
VCJCS . Given his stature, critics may have been reluctant
to voice their opinions. Second, since the concept remains
under discussion at the JROC, most writers, specifically
military people, are waiting some clearer definition of the
MOB before commenting.
The two defining documents are Admiral Owens' s book.
High Seas, and a study commissioned by the JCS written by
the Logistics Management Institute.
A. HIGH SEAS.
In his book. High Seas, Admiral Owens offers a vision
of the types of systems the next generation military should
acquire. Critical to understanding the problem of planning
for 20-25 years in the future and the MOB is understanding
Owens' s theory of planning for 2021. The forces for the
year 2021 he announced, "could differ greatly from what we
see today."" With respect to the Navy, he urged the
service had two options: first, it could "look at the kinds
"High Seas, p. 161,
15
of ships, aircraft, and major weapons systems that are on
the drawing boards today." Alternatively, it could "extend
today's ideas and trends to their logical conclusion."
Owens dismissed the first approach as too "rooted in the
perspectives and concerns of the past." He claimed the
systems being planned today are reflections of Cold War
perceptions, and not based on a discerning vision of future
military actions. The solution, Owens concluded, was to
extend today's "ideas and innovations to their logical
future conclusions."
The problem with trying to use trends and ideas to
predict the future is the difficulty of trying to decide
what will evolve and what will become extinct. Owens states
that if we can come close to the trends and ideas that will
survive, we can ascertain a long-term planning approach that
will produce better results then merely trying to re-win the
Cold War. The essence of Owens' s argument is that we should
look to the future and try to design systems that respond to
a future threat instead of trying to keep fighting the Cold
War for the next 20 years. Stated differently, Owens
believes we need to guess better about the future.
Owens' s vision of future naval systems is tied to two
major naval force functions: presence and war-fighting.
Naval presence, he says, should be the job of today's large
nuclear carriers and big deck amphibious ships . These ships
would carry weapons and forces tailored to respond to a
16
particular threat or geographic area rather than carrying a
standard complement of weapons and forces.-^'' These ships
would be the first on the scene to respond to a specific
contingency. Examples could include a Non-combatant
Evacuation Operation (NEO) of a US embassy, hostage rescue,
or pirate seizure operations. These are examples of what
the military today calls contingency operations.
By contrast, war-fighting would be the job of platforms
that ''^might be capable of supporting operations of three to
five hundred advanced tactical aircraft [per day] as well as
large transports and vertical lift aircraft." The war-
fighting platform would be deployed only in times of
imminent hostilities, and when a long-term presence is
required. The MOB is a case in point. Its purpose, Owens
reports, is to "have an island wherever we wanted one," and
have a flexible platform to be able to respond to a wide
spectrum of potential conflicts. While Owens distinguishes
between presence and war-fighting platforms, in actuality
the two functions overlap considerably. Wars can be fought
from "presence" ships and an MOB could be a strong and
highly visible statement of US intention to maintain a
presence in an area.
The seagoing capacity of an MOB, as envisaged by the
VCJCS, would be larger than anything considered heretofore.
17
Notionally, it would displace greater than 500,000 tons
(ktons)and operate more than 300 aircraft, presumably per
day, from all services. Seagoing speed of advance would be
slow, perhaps 6 knots. Alternatively, it might be assembled
in-theater from modular components. The pre-eminent
advantage of this concept over "conventional" carriers would
be its unlimited on-station time and, it is claimed, a
superior sea-keeping capability.
Owens outlined his vision of an MOB in very general,
functional terms. The overall requirements are unlimited
on-station time, logistic, maintenance, and tactical support
of 300-500 tactical and support aircraft, and cost-
effectiveness in comparison to life-cycle and manning costs
of today's aircraft carriers.
B. LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
In 1994, the Joint Staff commissioned the Logistics
Management Institute (LMI) of McLean, VA to produce a
Concept of Operations for an MOB. The study was submitted
to the Joint Staff in February 1995.^^ In general, LMI
report expands upon Admiral Owens' concept; High Seas
outlines the general characteristics of the MOB and the LMI
study defines and refines what the MOB should be able to do.
This thesis does not attempt to evaluate or analyze the
Logistics Management Institute, General Concept of Operation for the Mobile
Offshore Base (MOB), 16 December 1994. Concepts for all five regional
Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) and four functional CinCs were also produced and
delivered to the Joint Staff in February 1995.
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relevance of these mission areas. It is, nevertheless,
necessary to generally understand the system's proposed
mission areas so as to formulate the most appropriate legal
position.
LMI's MOB concept is based on a building block (or
LEGO) approach whereby "functional capabilities placed on
each [MOB] will maximize use of containerization and
modularized packaging. "^^ The idea is to prepare for future
technologies by designing a platform that can be quickly
adapted to new command, control, communications, cryptology,
and intelligence (C4I) capabilities. The notional minimum
force configuration of any MOB will contain an "advanced
[C4I] mechanism", nation-building capability in the form of
a US Army Civil Affairs Detachment, and enough equipment for
any assigned US Army unit to respond to a hostile battalion-
sized force. ^^
According to the LMI study, an MOB can be ^built' for
any regionally specific role and be a staging area for six
mission areas: force projection, forward operating base,
logistics support base, deep attack and strike, nation
building, and humanitarian support. Half of the mission
areas (logistics hub, nation building, and humanitarian
support) concern the presence function of the MOB, while the
other three connect the presence attributes of the MOB with
General Concept of Operations, p. 1.
"ibid.
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a war-fighting capability. It is not necessary to go into
greater detail about MOB mission areas for the purposes of
this thesis. The intended and actual uses are the
significant factors for legal consideration, not whether the
MOB can support Army Civil Affairs Detachments or land C-
17s.
The legal character of the MOB could have significant
repercussions as to the rights and responses available to a
theater CinC. In all mission areas, the proposed scenario
is a low-level Operation Other than War (OOTW) that expands
to become a Major Regional Conflict (MRC) . The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea outlines the ocean
control regime of the future and influences how the US
forces should plan around and employ the MOB. The next
section explores the manner in which international and
admiralty law affects such tactical decisions as whether to
subtract some mission areas in order to preserve some more
desirable capability. For example, increasing the system's
medical facilities or nation-building capability at the cost
of reducing the number of power projection aircraft. This
decision could be made to ensure a more advantageous
position within a territorial sea of a friendly coastal
nation or defer an UNCLOS dispute resolution procedure
initiated by a hostile coastal nation. The central issue is




The preceding discussion reviewed the origin of the MOB
concept and how some military envisage using the MOB. This
chapter examines international law in an effort to determine
where the MOB can be legally placed. It also reviews the
potential uses of the MOB so as to more clearly examine the
most appropriate legal position. The discussion initially
covers the US position regarding the 1983 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is followed by a
detailed explanation of the Convention's Sea Demarcation
Regime. The bulk of the legal analysis covers the
definitional problems between what is clearly stated in the
Convention, what is omitted (whether intentionally or
unintentionally) , what can be gleaned from customary
international law, and any helpful information from US
admiralty law.
The 1983 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) is an unprecedented document in international
law and relations. For the first time, there is a single
document that endeavors to outline all nations' rights and
responsibilities regarding the use of the sea. The entire
previous 600 years of customary international law was
considered and standardized in a single doctrine applicable
to all signatory nations. Any analysis of contemplated
actions that have law of the sea implications must start
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with a thorough explanation of the applicable sections of
UNCLOS. Any gaps within the UNCLOS framework should be
filled in by customary law as defined by state practice and
general principles of international law. Where there are
no general rules of international law, US municipal law is
used to assist the analysis.
On November 16, 1994, UNCLOS entered into force over
the US and major industrial nations' refusal to sign it in
the 1980' s.-^® The United States is presently in the process
of acceding to the Treaty. ^^ This chapter outlines the
major sections of UNCLOS, customary international law, and
illustrative US domestic law that could possibly affect
placement of the MOB.
A. THE US POSITION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA.
On July 9, 1982 President Reagan announced his decision
not to sign UNCLOS. ^° The reservation concerned Part XI,
the deep seabed mining section."'-^ The US position was that
Part XI was flawed because it did not give the United States
a voice commensurate with its interest; that it would deter
private investment; that it would compel the United States
to transfer technology, and would limit seabed resource
38statement of Hon. David Colson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans,
Department of State, before the Comariittee on Foreign Relations (Washington, DC,
August 11, 1994) (hereinafter August 1994 Hearings), p. 12.
LT T. Tierney, Department of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, 06
November 1995. The Treaty is presently in Congressional Committee awaiting
advice and consent.
Luke T. Lee, "The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States," 77 American
Journal of International Law 541 (1984) citing Statement by the President,
released by the Department of State on July, 9, 1982, 18 Weekly Comp. Pres . Doc.
887 (12 July 1982)
.
"'August 1994 Hearings, pp. 8-9.
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production in an unacceptable manner/^ Since then, the US
position has consistently been to abide by all non-seabed
provisions of the Treaty without signing it."-^
On July 28, 1994, the United Nations adopted, and the
United States signed, the Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 10, 1982. This
Agreement reforms the deep seabed mining aspects of Part XI
of UNCLOS to correct past US objections.''^ UNCLOS went into
effect November 16, 1994, and the provisions of the 1994
agreement should go into effect upon proper ratification.''^
The major effect of US ratification of Part XI is to
formally include the United States in the UNCLOS regime.
United States ratification will indicate acceptance of the
terms of the Treaty by accession. During hearings before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the summer of
1994, representatives from the Joints Chiefs of Staff, State
Department, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
Department of Defense Office of International Affairs and
Intelligence, and the US Coast Guard unanimously advocated
adoption of UNCLOS as modified by the 1994 Agreement. ^^
In sum, the United States agreed to abide by all the







in the process of acceding to the UNCLOS regime in 1996.
After determining the appropriate treaty to be considered
(UNCLOS), it is important to understand what UNCLOS covers.
B. THE UNCLOS SEA DEMARCATION REGIME.
Prior to any in-depth analysis of any UNCLOS or
admiralty issues, it is critical to define the existing
legal divisions of the oceans.
1. Baseline Determination.
The first issue is how to determine where land ends and
sea begins, or how to start measuring the territorial sea.
Articles 3-16 provide some guidance for determining
baselines, but this issue is very sensitive and fact-
specific. Each baseline must be computed on a case-by-case
basis due to historic bays, mouths of rivers, and numerous
other methods and exceptions that determine a state's
baseline for territorial sea determination.''^ All the rules
and minute permutations regarding baseline determination are
beyond the scope of this thesis. The general rule embodied
in UNCLOS is to measure from the low water mark.''^
2. The Territorial Sea.
Article 2 of UNCLOS defines the territorial sea of a
nation as 12 nautical miles (NM) from the baseline. In this
47
United States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Seas: No, 112: United States
Responses to Excessive National Maritime Claims, (Washington DC: Department of State,
March 9^^ 1992)
.
See generally, The Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway) 1951 I.C.J. 116. For a
detailed explanation of how to determine the low-water mark, see Boggs, "Delimitation of
Seaward Areas Under National Jurisdiction," 45 American Journal of International Law 240
(1951) .
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area a nation may exercise, ""'the same sovereignty ... as it
has with respect to its land territory . '"'^ The sole
exception to this rule is the right of innocent passage as
defined below in Section C, 3.
3. The Contiguous Zone.
The contiguous zone is 24 NM from the baseline wherein
a nation may exercise control to prevent violation of
customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws within its
territory or territorial sea.^°
4. The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) .
The EEZ is a development of the latter half of the 20th
century. Prior to the development of the EEZ, all waters
seaward of the contiguous zone were considered high seas.^-^
Articles 55-75 of UNCLOS establish a 200 NM zone in which a
coastal state has not only sovereign rights for exploring,
exploiting, conserving, and managing all the living
resources therein, but also such rights with respect to the
non-living resources of the seabed. These seabed rights
include the subsoil and superadjacent waters and other
activities undertaken for the economic exploitation and
exploration of the zone, to include production of energy
from the water, currents, and winds. ^^ Additionally the
^'united Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, entered into force, Nov. 16,
1994, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982) (hereinafter UNCLOS), Article 2. See also
Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International
Law, 5th ed. (New York: Macmillian, 1986)
, pp. 356-359.
'"UNCLOS, Arts. 33(1) and 33(2). See also von Glahn, p. 379.
^'2 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 651 (1941),
"UNCLOS, Art. 56.
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coastal state has some limited jurisdiction over the
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations
and structures, marine scientific research, and the
protection and preservation of the marine environment.^-'
Granting a coastal state the rights stated in the
previous paragraph does not imply a widespread grant of
authority over the EEZ. Restraints on the exercise of
coastal state jurisdiction in the EEZ exist. For example.
Articles 58(1) -(2) provide that all nations may exercise the
high seas freedom of navigation and overflight to include
laying submarine cables and pipelines. Articles 56(2) and
58(3) create reciprocal duties for coastal states and states
exercising rights in the EEZ to give '''due regard" to
^'lawful'' coastal state laws and reasonable performance of
international rights.
5. The Continental Shelf.
Article 76 of UNCLOS outlines the relevant definition
of what is considered a coastal nation's continental shelf.
Without descending into the argument as to what is the
shelf, the important issue is the rights nations have over
the shelf and where these rights begin and end. Realizing
the difficulty of determining the limits of the continental
shelf, the treaty negotiators established a commission to
make "final and binding" determinations regarding coastal
"UNCLOS, Arts 5 6 (1) (b) and 60.
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nation shelf claims. ^'^ Broadly speaking, the rights over
the continental shelf and EEZ are similar. ^^ The pertinent
issue for most nations is whether their respective shelves
extend beyond the 200 NM EEZ. If a coastal nation
determines its shelf is beyond the 200 NM EEZ, the nation
can exert jurisdiction to the limits of the shelf. ^^ But in
no case may a nation exert rights beyond 350 NM from the
measuring baseline. ^^
In summary, all nations may exercise EEZ rights in an
area up to 200 NM from the measuring baseline.
Additionally, a coastal nation may exercise EEZ rights to
the limits of the continental shelf but in no case beyond
350 NM from the baseline. The coastal nation retains the
right to control all shelf exploitation, and no nation may
undertake actions without the coastal nation's consent,^® to
include "drilling on the shelf for all purposes. "^^ In
contrast, the coastal nation may not "unjustifiably
interfere" with the normal rights of the high seas.^°
Article 60, regarding artificial islands, structures and
installations in the EEZ, is applied mutatis mutandis to the
continental shelf.
6. The High Seas.
'"UNCLOS, Art 76(8) and Annex II.
"UNCLOS, Art 77(1) and EEZ discussion above.
'*Louis B. Sohn and Kristen Gustafson, The Law of the Sea, (West: St. Paul,
Minn., 1984) p. 158.
"UNCLOS, Art 76(6)
.
'*UNCLOS, Art 77 (2) .
^'UNCLOS, Art 81.
*°UNCLOS, Arts 78 and 87.
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Article 86 defines the high seas as all water not in
the internal waters, territorial seas, or EEZ of any nation,
nor the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state. All
nations may exercise traditional freedoms of navigation,
overflight, and submarine cable laying on the high seas.^-^
Additionally, nations may construct artificial islands, fish
freely, and engage in scientific research subject to the
limitations of the treaty. ^^ There is one intuitive
limitation on the rights of a nation on the high seas. All
nations must exercise "due regard" for interests of other
states while on the high seas.^^ Article 88 reserves the




(1) Baseline - 12 NM.
(2) Coastal State exercises sovereign control.
b. Contiguous Zone.
(1) Baseline - 24 NM.
(2) Coastal State enforces customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitary laws.
c. Exclusive Economic Zone.
(1) Baseline - 200 NM.
*'UNCLOS, Art 87.
"Ibid.
"UNCLOS, Art 8 7 (2)
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(2) Coastal State has jurisdiction to reasonably:
(A) Explore, exploit, conserve, and manage
living and non-living resources of the seabed and
superjacent waters. Includes energy from water, currents,
and winds.
(B) Establish "artificial islands,
installations, and structures," conduct marine research, and
marine environment protection.
d. Continental Shelf.
(1) Baseline - 2,500 meter Isobath plus 100 NM
not to exceed baseline plus 350 NM.
(2) Coastal State has jurisdiction to:
(A) Explore and exploit the natural
resources of the seabed but not the superjacent waters.
(B) Establish "artificial islands,
installations, and structures," conduct marine research, and
marine environment protection.
(C) Authorize and regulate drilling for
whatever purpose.
e. High Seas.
(1) All waters not internal waters. Territorial
Sea, or Exclusive Economic Zone.
(2) Coastal States have no jurisdiction, except
in cases of piracy where a warship or military aircraft of
any state may seize a pirate ship on the high seas, ^"*or any
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other place outside the jurisdiction of any state [.]"^^
C. DEFINITIONS.
The central definitional problem of this thesis is
whether the MOB is a ship or something else. If it is a
ship, is it a warship or merchant vessel. If it is not a
ship, is it, therefore, an artificial island, an
installation or a structure? The ship definition section
begins with a customary international law discussion because
UNCLOS is devoid of any attempt to define ships beyond
customary law.
1. Ship.
a. Customary International Law Regarding Ships.
The customary law on the definition of a ship can
be summed up as very easy to comprehend but extremely
difficult to define. For the purposes of this thesis, """^the
word ^ship' must be taken as including all types of ships
whatever their size or purpose."" This definition can be
reduced to three factors distilled from international
agreements and state municipal law: (1) means of
propulsion, (2) ownership, and (3) navigability and
navigation. ^^ There are a number of questions a maritime
judge could ask to further find whether an object is a ship.
They are:
64 UNCLOS Article 105. See generally Articles 100-107.
65 Nilos Papadakis, The International Legal Regime of Artificial Islands,
(Leyden: Sijthoff, 1977) pp. 96-99.
66 Ibid, p. 99.
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What is the design of the object?
What is the purpose for which it was built, its
function, and actual use?
What is the means of propulsion?^''
Is there a rudder and what is the manning of the
object?^^
What is the degree of stationariness and mobility of
the object?
Will the object be subjected to ordinary maritime
risk?^^
The conclusion to be drawn from these factors is that trying
to define the legal status of ship must rest in a factual
determination to be made on a case-by-case basis. A number
of factors that could be used in determining the status of
the MOB can be gleaned from US Admiralty law.
b. US Admiralty Law Regarding Ships.
The Jones Act''° is the litigation vehicle that has
caused the most controversy in US admiralty law regarding
what a vessel is and what it is not. The Jones Act permits
a worker injured on a vessel to seek federal judicial relief
instead of relying on state based actions grounded on
territorial jurisdiction. The legislation was a response to
the situation in which ship workers and crew attached to
ships were not eligible for state worker's compensation due
to their status as not being employed in a state. The
initial burden of proof is for the plaintiff to show he was
*^But a ship need not be able to navigate under her own power.
*^he absence of a rudder or a crew does not mean the object is not a ship.
^'Papadakis, pp. 100-101. Papadakis goes on to argue that floating airports are
not ships in the strict sense ^ but nor are they islands, and it "would be
inappropriate to treat these platforms . . .as ships." p. 102. He further admits
there are very few restrictions on the scope of the legal definition of a ship
reducing the confidence of his opinion that floating airports should not be
considered ships, p. 103.
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working on a vessel and not a platform. If the plaintiff
can prove he was on a vessel, the claim may proceed in
federal court. If not, the case is remanded to state court
for adjudication. Before delving into the limits of
definitions, the Fifth Circuit (in Louisiana) admonished
that a vessel is ""incapable of precise definition."''^
The beginning of all vessel determinations is The
Robert W. Parson''^ wherein the Supreme Court stated the
general rule that the purpose for which a craft was created
governed vessel determination. In 1908, in Phoenix Const.
V. The Steamer Poughkeepsie/^ the Supreme Court clearly
stated that drilling platforms were not within admiralty
jurisdiction. These two cases establish the limits of the
decision spectrum. At one end of the spectrum is a free
floating vessel intended to travel over the ocean, and at
the other end is the platform solidly attached to the ocean
floor with no design or intent to periodically move.
There are several statutory definitions, but the
root of all US ship determinations begins with 1 USC 3 that
defines a vessel as ""every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of use, as a
means of transportation on water. "''^ The only significant
derivation from this definition in US law is 33 USC 1601,
^Ducote V Keeler & Co., 953 F.2d 1000, {5th Cir. 1992)
"l91 US 17, 24 S Ct 8, 48 L Ed 73 (1903)
.
"212 US 558, 28 S Ct 687, 53 L Ed 651.
''"l USC 3. See 10 USC 101, 32 USC 101, 33 USC 902(21), 33 USC 1601, 37 USC 101,
46 USC 2101(45), and 46 App.Sec 1241o.
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where the International Regulations to Prevent Collisions at
Sea adds, "nondisplacement craft and seaplanes" to the
definition of watercraft required to adhere to the "Rules of
the Road."
US case law on this issue offers a wealth of
defining information. A vessel should float and be equipped
with self-propulsion or with the capability to be towed long
distances. ^^ A significant factor to consider when
determining the purpose of craft construction and
^^permanence" is whether the craft is intended to move and
the frequency of moves. ^^ Presumably, the greater the
frequency of moves of the craft, the easier it will be to
conclude the craft is a vessel. But merely because a barge
is not moved for a period of months does not "affect the
conclusion that it was designed for transportation of goods
over navigable waters."''"' In addition, a mobile structure
that temporarily pierces the ocean floor with an anchoring
device that can be retracted when the structure is moved
"can be considered a vessel throughout."''^
A secondary consideration for vessel determination
is whether the craft is equipped with the requisite day
shapes, navigation lights, etc., required by the
International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at
''^J.M.L. Trading Corp. v Marine Salvage Corp., 501 F.Supp. 323 (E.D. N.Y. 1980)
''^Offshore Co. v Rohison, 266 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1969).
^''Srunet v Boh Bros Const., 715 F.2d 196 (1983).
''^Hicks V Ocean Drilling and Explorations Co., 512 F.2d 817 (5th Cir 1975).
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Sea (72 COLREGS) . Complying with the 72 COLREGS for vessels
goes to prove a craft is a vessel and not a platform. ^^
Ships (or vessels) , in municipal and international
law, are simple to define in general, but difficult to
define in specifics. The best way to think about how to
define ships is to apply a type of "totality of
circumstances" test. A ship need not display the
traditional features of a ship (e.g., bow, stern, keel); nor
does long-term anchoring alter the status of the ship. As
long as the ship was constructed for the purpose of water
travel and not permanently attached to the sea bed, the ship
retains its status. Other factors and features can go to
prove the nature of the ship, e.g., rudder, motive force,
displacement, etc. Since the MOB will not be permanently
anchored to the seabed and displays most of the attributes
of a ship and not a platform, what will be the character of
the MOB, warship or merchant vessel?
c. Warship or Merchant Vessel?
Historically, the issue of what constitutes a
warship has not been contentious, but Article 29 of UNCLOS
outlines a definition to distinguish a warship from a
merchant ship. A warship is defined as a ship belonging to
the armed forces of a state bearing external marks
^'See Ducote at n. 33. See also Bernard v Binnings Const. Co., 741 F.2d 824, 832
at n. 25 (5th Cir 1984) . For an excellent discussion regarding vessels and
jurisdiction under US law, see, Jo Desha Lucas, 3rd ed.. Cases and Materials on
Admiralty, (New York: Foundation Press, 1987) pp. 126-135.
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identifying its nationality, under the command of an officer
duly commissioned by the government of the state and whose
name appears in the appropriate service list or equivalent,
and manned by a crew under regular armed forces
discipline."®" The reference to "armed forces" instead of
"naval" recognizes that many nations do not distinguish
between ships operated by armies, coast guards, or air
forces. ^-^
The Treaty does not directly address what
constitutes a merchant ship, but by implication, state
practice, and customary law definitions, a reasonable
definition can be outlined. The general rule of merchant
shipping is that it is privately owned, employed, and
managed for profit.®^ The historical difficulty of this
definition has been that in time of war, commercial merchant
ships are operated by governments for purposes other than
profit, essentially for national security purposes." A
third complicating situation arises in peacetime with state-
owned shipping companies. The difficult legal question is
*°UNCLOS Article 29 is reflected in 46 USC 2101(47) (a) - (d) .
^'Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 24 Virginia Journal of International Law 809, (1984) p. 813
(hereinafter Oxman, Regime)
.
*^Charles D. Gibson, Merchantman? or Ship of War?: A Synopsis of Laws; State
Department Positions ; and Practices Which Alter the Peaceful Character of U.S.
Merchant Vessels in Time of Nar, (Camden: Ensign Press, 1986) p. iv, definitions.
"This point is the general thesis of Gibson, Merchantman?, and a vexing problem
of pre-UNCLOS international law. Although von Glahn (p. 3 65) argues Government
ships operated for non-commercial purposes have always been granted warship
immunity, this is not a universally accepted interpretation. The entire premise
of Gibson, Merchantman? and the Merchant Marine efforts to receive veteran status




whether these companies are operated for profit or for
national security reasons. UNCLOS effectively diminishes
this difficulty by separating previous customary law
definitions into "Merchant ships and Government ships
operated for commercial and non-commercial purposes."^''
Merchant ships and government ships operated for commercial
purposes are treated the same as merchant ships. ®^
Government ships operated for non-commercial purposes are
treated as warships with the same immunities on the high
seas .^^
Therefore, if the MOB is a government ship
operated for commercial purposes - a difficult argument to
make in light of the military flavor of its cargo and crew -
then it should be treated as a merchant ship. If, on the
other hand, it is a government ship operated for non-
commercial purposes, it will have all the immunities of a
warship. The best apparent position is to ensure the MOB is
considered a warship under Article 29 of the Treaty. The
advantage of a clearly defined determination of warship
status is evident upon examining the warship immunity.
d. Warship Immunity.
One of the most widely recognized precepts of
international law concerns the immunity of warships from
foreign interference on the high seas:
*^X;NCL0S, Part II, Section 3, Subsections B and C.
^^UNCLOS, Arts. 2 7 and 28.
^^UNCLOS, Art. 96.
36
[WJarships represent the sovereignty and
independence of their state more fully than anything
else can represent it on the ocean; they can be met
only by their equals there, and equal cannot exercise
jurisdiction over equals. The jurisdiction of their
own state is therefore exclusive under all
circumstances and any act of interference with them on
part of a foreign State is an act of war.^^
This rule is codified in UNCLOS Article 95. Although
warships retain a broad range of freedoms on the oceans,
these freedoms must be exercised '^"'with due regard for the
interests of other States in their exercise of freedom of
the high seas . "^^
Warships are excluded from the marine protection
and preservation requirements of UNCLOS in Article 236.
They are not considered significant sources of pollution and
exercise of this type of jurisdiction would not be in the
interest of the signatory states. ^^ But, ^'it was not
considered unrealistic to expect a high degree of self-
imposed environmental diligence by major flag states."^"
Up to this point, it has been argued that the MOB
should be treated as a is a sea-going ship, specifically
that it should be considered a warship of the US government.
In order to strengthen the legal argument for treating the
MOB as a warship, it is useful to clarify what the MOB is
not. Namely, the strongest and most reasonable claim a
^''Burdick H. Brittin, International Law for Seagoing Officers, 5th ed.
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 113 (citing Higgins, International









coastal state can make regarding the MOB is that it is an
artificial island, an installation, or a structure under the
UNCLOS regime.
2. Artificial Islands, Installations and Structures.
a . UNCLOS .
Article 60 grants the coastal state the "exclusive
right" to construct, authorize, and regulate the
construction and operation of artificial islands in the EEZ
and continental shelf. ^-^ The coastal state may also
regulate installations and structures within the EEZ for
resource and other economic purposes plus scientific
research. ^^ The intent of the article is to allow the
coastal State to manage the resource exploitation and
scientific research done within its EEZ.^^ The contentious
issue concerns the exact definition of what constitutes an
artificial island, structure, or installation. The Treaty
text is devoid of guidelines for this determination.^''
The UNCLOS III travaux preparatoires is very
limited in its discussion of the structure, artificial
island, or installation determination. One reference from a
1972 definition working group meeting indicates
"john Woodliffe, The Peacetime Use of Foreign Military Installations under
International Law, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) p. 96.
'^Jon M. Van Dyke, Consensus and Confrontation: The United States and the Law of
the Sea Convention, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1984) pp. 158-159.
'ciyde Sanger, Ordering the Oceans: The Making of the Law of the Sea, (London:
Zed Books, 1986), pp. 130-131.
Satya V. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, eds
. , United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, vol. II, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993) p.
584 (hereinafter Nandan and Rosenne)
.
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''^artificial' should be inserted between 'offshore' and
'islands' [in order to provide] for the coastal state's
exclusive right to authorize and regulate construction and
operation of offshore artificial islands and other
installations used for the exploration and exploitation of
the non-renewable resources thereof. "^^ One possible
explanation for the lack of discussion during the UNCLOS III
negotiations is that the 1958 Law of the Sea meeting issued
the Convention on the Continental Shelf that addressed most
of these questions and the issue was believed to be settled.
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf states that the
coastal state is entitled to "construct and operate"
installations and other devices "necessary for [Continental
Shelf] exploration and the exploitation of its natural
resources . "^^ Coastal states were not allowed "to prohibit
installations not designed for extractive purposes. "^^ The
intent was to prohibit states from making sovereignty claims
over the high seas.^^
It is interesting to note a 1974 proposal by 18
African states that resurrected the previously rejected
sovereignty issue. It stated:
No nation shall be entitled to construct,
maintain, deploy, or operate, in the Exclusive Economic
''Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-74) Vol. 2,
Official Records (United Nations: New York, 1975) 22nd meeting, 31 July 1974, p
172 (hereinafter UNCLOS III 1973-74) .
'*Nandan and Rosenne, pp. 573-574.
Note, Jurisdictional Problems Created by Artificial Islands, 10 San Diego Law
Review 638 (1973) p. 654 (hereinafter Note, Artificial Islands)
.
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Zone of another state, any military installation or
device or any other installations or devices for
whatever purposes, without the consent of the Coastal
State. ^^
This proposal was not even included in working paper
discussions. A 1976 Peruvian proposal would have had the
same effect as the African proposal but did not elicit
enough support to be accepted. ^°°
The previous points argue for the conclusion that
if a structure is not erected for the purpose of non-
renewable resource exploration or exploitation, it is not
under the jurisdiction of the coastal state. The use of the
resource exploration or exploitation terms in the yearly
reports to the Secretary-General show a strong bias towards
the specific economic aspects of the terms over the general,
non-defined jurisdictional aspects. -^"^ This economic bias
was evident when by several maritime nations during the
UNCLOS III negotiations "did not view as contrary to
international law the construction of installations for
military purposes by one state in the economic zone of
another . ""^"^ It must be reemphasized that a nation may not
build an artificial island in the EEZ or continental shelf
of another without the coastal state's permission. ^°^ This
''ibid, p. 578.
'°°Ibid, pp. 581 and 584-585.
See, for e.g., The Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, International
Organizations and the Law of the Sea: Documentary Yearbook 1987, (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987) p. 20 citing Law of the Sea Report of the Secretary
General, doc.no:A/42/688 pares 34-38 (hereinafter 1987 Yearbook).
'"Voodliffe, p. 95.
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seems reasonable in light of the reason for the creation of
the EEZ regime, namely, the control and coordination of
living and non-living resource exploitation. From this
analysis, it can be concluded that the placement of a MOB
anywhere within the EEZ can only be objected to by reference
to the Convention' s provision' s that bar interference with
the exploration and exploitation of EEZ resources NOT under
the Article 60 general grant of jurisdiction. Only Mexico
has added any defining language to its enabling domestic
legislation for UNCLOS.-^°'' Mexico reserves the right to
control "''^immovable property" used for EEZ exploration and
exploitation. ^°^
The United Nations has made a small in-road in
defining the difference between installations and structures
versus vessels. When a mobile drilling unit (MODU) is ^'in
transit and not engaged in drilling operations" it is
considered a vessel, but when it is engaged in drilling
operations it is considered a structure or installation. ^°^
The nature of the attachment to the seabed appears to be the
significant definitive factor for vessel versus structure or
installation determination. -^"^
In the absence of clear treaty language to enable
'"^office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
United Nations, The Law of the Sea: National Legislation on the Exclusive
Economic Zone, (New York: United Nations, 1993) .
'°^Ibid, p. 220.
'°*United Nations General Assembly, Measures to Prevent Infringement of Safety-
Zones Around Offshore Installations or Structures, Adopted 4 January 1988,
Doc.no:A25/Res.621, reprinted in Yearbook 1987, pp. 330-335.
'"Oxman, Regime, p. 843.
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a positive decision regarding the vessel versus structure or
installation status of the MOB, it is prudent to examine
general principles of international law to clarify the
issue.
b. Customary International Law.
This source of international law concerns the
examination of the interaction of countries as evidenced by
their state practice and official policies. As these
practices become more widespread, they develop into law and
eventually into treaties.
(1) Artificial Islands. The 1958 Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone codified the
customary law understanding of an artificial island by
defining an island as '"a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. "-^"^
The use of "naturally formed'' gives rise to an issue of
interpretation as to what is formed or created. If a spoil
(river dredge refuse) bank is created near a naturally
formed island, then it presumably becomes an ''artificially
formed' island. It is a geographic island, but it would not
fall within the legal regime for computing a baseline to
measure the territorial sea.^°^
Another definition states that an artificial island is
108Gary Knight and Hungdah Chiu, The International Law of The Sea: Cases,
Doc^^ents, and Readings, (New York: Elsevier Applied Science, 1993), p. 63.
See Generally, Ibid, pp. 64-64.
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a ""'non-naturally formed structure, permanently attached to
the seabed, surrounded by water, which is above water at
high tide."^^° A third writer has added "steel, such as the
common off-shore oil platform" to the material and
definition of an artificial island. •^^^ In addition, deep
water ports for fueling supertankers at sea should be
considered artificial islands with no territorial sea.-^-^^
Analysis of the prefatory work for UNCLOS
indicates there are structures that are not natural islands
and therefore should be considered artificial islands. They
include:
(1) Natural materials artificially placed on the
seas, for instance, sand, stones, clay, or rocks dumped
on the seas in the shallow waters, even though they
show permanently above water at high tide...
(4) Navigational aids, such as lighthouses, light-
ships, beacons and buoys.
(5) Artificial structures, for example,
installations erected on the sea-bed, drilling
platforms and floating objects.
(6) Artificial structures erected on a pre-
existing natural formation, for example, on shallow
sand-banks or drying rocks, even though they are
visible at high tide.-^-^-^
(2) Installations. The problems surrounding
defining installations have arisen recently after the
discovery of offshore oil and how to exploit that resource.
First, installations that do not serve "an economic purpose"
Papdakis, p. 6. See also Note, Artificial Islands, p. 638.
Note, Artificial Islands, p. 638; see also Brittin, p. 90.
D.P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea, Vol.2 (Clarendon: oxford,
1984) pp. 846-847.
^ Brittin, p. 96-97.
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or do not interfere with the exercise of a coastal state's
rights within the EEZ are not within the scope of Article
60.-^^'' For a nation to assert jurisdiction over an
installation within the EEZ, the installation must have an
economic purpose or must interfere with the exercise of the
coastal state's rights. After excluding non-economic
installations, UNCLOS does not provide further guidance
regarding the definition of an installation. Prior to
UNCLOS, installations "'refer [red] collectively to as man-
made structures from such other materials as concrete and
steel, for example, drilling platforms . "^-^^
One definitional development independent of UNCLOS has
occurred in the offshore oil and gas drilling industry. For
example. North Sea oil and gas exploitation treaties support
the conclusion thit, for the purpose of international law,
an installation is a petroleum facility. One agreement
states.
Offshore Facility means... any installation or
portion t lereof of any kind, fixed or mobile, used for
the purpose of exploring for producing, treating,
storing or transporting crude oil from the seabed or
its subsoil [.] ^^^
The Seabed Pollution Liability Convention similarly states,
...installation means (a) any well or other
facility, whether fixed or mobile, which is used for
the purpose of exploring for, producing, treating.
114
Nandan and Rosenne, P. 58 4.
Papadakis, p. 6.
David Freestone and Ton Ijlstra, eds
.
, The North Sea: Basic Legal
Documents on Regional Environmental Co-operation, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1992), p. 320.
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storing, control of the flow of crude transmitting or
regaining control of the flow of crude from the seabed
or its subsoil. ^^''
Within the general understanding of the North Sea treaties,
the common understanding of "installation" is that it is an
offshore platform used for petroleum removal from the
seabed.
A corollary to this issue is the concern with maritime
safety around oil platforms. In the 1980s, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) began work on a
regime to ensure the removal of unused installations and
structures in the oceans. ^-^^ The overwhelming concern of the
IMO in these negotiations has been with navigation safety
and pollution prevention. The crux of the arrangement is to
remove the oil platforms that dot the EEZ and continental
shelf. This effort supports the contention that the UN and
UNCLOS are primarily concerned with installations and
structures with an economic or exploitative purpose.
(3) Structure. It can be safely argued
"structures fixed on the seabed cannot in reason be
considered ships. "-^-^^ The Netherlands' government handling
of the offshore R.E.M. broadcasting station is indicative of
the distinction to be made between ships and structures.
"^ Ibid, p. 345.
The Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, International Organizations
and the Law of the Sea: Documentary Yearbook 1988, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,




The Netherlands took action only against the platform
housing the R.E.M. radio station and not the ^pirate' radio
ship Veronica. The Parliamentary discussions raised the
issue that the Dutch government could exercise jurisdiction
only over the platform due to the nature of its attachment
to the seabed. Conversely, no action could be taken against
the Veronica because it was ship, not under Dutch
jurisdiction. ^^°
Underlying the confusion of trying to define
installation and structure is the practice of using them
interchangeably in the literature .-^^-^ Indeed, when all is
said and done, there appears to be no realistic differences
between structures, installations, and artificial islands.
The best way to think of the structure-installation
distinction is as two sides of the same coin. Some treaties
and writers call the object a structure, and others call it
an installation. The concept of artificial island is a
little clearer with its artificial formation requirement.
Apparently, UNCLOS Article 60 tried to cover all bases by
including both terms in the text.
(4) Finland v. Denmark. Another stumbling
block to clarifying the vessel versus structure or
installation debate is the lack of precedent in
international case law, especially under the UNCLOS regime.
'^'See e.g. Ibid, p. 134.
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A good case would have been The Great Belt Case^^^ between
Finland and Denmark that was to have been argued before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on its merits in 1992.
Denmark proposed to build a bridge over the Great Belt that
would have seriously limited access to the sea by large
ocean drilling platforms built by a Finnish manufacturer.
Under the terms of an existing navigation treaty between
Finland and Denmark, neither nation could interfere with
vessel navigation through the Belt. Unfortunately, for this
thesis, the two nations settled the case before any decision
could be reached by the ICJ.-^^^ The point is that the issue
is not clearly decided and reasonable countries can differ
as to what constitutes a ship and what a platform.
c. US Admiralty Law Regarding Platforms.
It is the permanence of the connection of the
supporting pipes or "legs" to the soil that makes a platform
an "artificial island" even though surrounded by the seas.
If the attachment to the ocean floor is intended to be
permanent, the platform is excluded from maritime
jurisdiction.-^^'' Structures with pilings driven through the
ocean floor are platforms, not vessels. ^^^ The Fifth circuit
'^^Passage through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), Provisional measures, 1991 ICJ
Rep. 12 (Order of July 29)
.
'
^Robert y. Jennings, "The United Nations at Fifty: The International Court of
Justice Turns Fifty," 89 American Journal of International Law 493, (1995) pp.
501-502. See also The Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea,
International Organizations and the Law of the Sea: Documentary Yearbook 1992,
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992) p. 145.
^^^Rodrigue v AETNA Casualty and Surety Co., 395 US 352, 89 S Ct 1835, 23 L Ed
360 (1969)
.
^^^Rhode V Southeastern Drilling Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir 1982).
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applied the Cook v Belden^^^ test in Ducote v Keeler and
Co.'^^'^ The test has three parts: (1) Was the craft
constructed as a platform; (2) Was the craft moored at the
time of the accident; and (3) Was the transportation
function more than incidental to the operation of the
craft. '^^ In Ducote^ the plaintiffs were successful on the
first two points but failed the third when the court
determined the transportation function was ''''purely
incidental. ''^29
The US admiralty legal position on the definition
of a platform can be distilled into a few sentences. First
and foremost/ a vessel is designed from the keel up as a
watercraft with the intention of operating on navigable
waters. A vessel is capable of self-propulsion as a primary
purpose or at least of being towed for long distances, it
and complies with the 72 COLREGS with respect to lights,
dayshapes, and safety equipment. If a drilling rig or other
mobile unit has its own propulsion and this means of
propulsion is used, the United States considers it to be a
ship.-^-^° Although a vessel may be moored for months at a
time, if the anchoring devices can be retracted with the
intention of periodic movement, it remains a vessel. The




"°RADM William L. Schachte, JAGC, USN, and J. Peter A. Bernhardt,
"International Straits and Navigational Freedoms," 33 Virginia Journal of
International Law 527, (1993) pp. 529-530.
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driving of mooring pilings into the ocean floor or otherwise
making the attachment to the ocean floor permanent shifts
the character of a vessel to that of a platform.
A significant corollary to the platform character
issue is which state should exercise jurisdiction over it.
In general, once a coastal state recognizes causes of action
in general tort, personal injury, or death, the proceedings
are subject to the coastal state's jurisdiction or
corporation nationality, depending upon the terms of the
exploitation contract and coastal state legislation. ^^^ It
should be noted here that jurisdiction and tort causes of
action are the concerns of developed nations; lesser
developed counties are not as concerned with jurisdiction or
torts. -^^^ There can be no all-encompassing statement
regarding the jurisdiction issues raised if an MOB is
considered a platform. Each prospective placement would
need to analyzed on a case-by-case basis for coastal state
municipal legislation and treaty obligations. The offshore
drilling rig example and illustrative law do not provide a
simple paradigm by which to make decisions for MOB
placement
.
'"Kenneth R. Simmonds, Oil and Gas Law: The North Sea Exploration, (New York:
Oceana, 1988), pp. 302-314
'^^David B. Keto, Law and
{New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 110-123
Offshore Oil Development : The North Sea Experience,
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D . CONCLUSIONS .
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the preceding
analysis. The UNCLOS sea demarcation regime is best
explained in Section B, sub-section 6 (a) - (e) . Warships
and government ships operated for non-commercial purpose
retain the customary law concept of warship immunity in its
entirety.
Artificial islands arise from man-deposited sea-bed
material or spoil and extend above the high water mark.
Artificial islands can also be formed by steel or concrete
that extend above the water' s surface at high tide on an
underwater seamount. Unlike naturally formed islands,
artificial islands do not have a territorial sea.
Installations or structures are man-made features
permanently attached to artificial islands or the seabed,
for example, lighthouses or oil drilling rigs. Their man-
made nature and permanent attachment to the seabed
distinguishes artificial islands, structures, or
installations from ships or vessels.
There is no ''^bright line" test to define when a ship
stops being a ship and becomes a structure. The UN
statement regarding MODUs being ships while underway and
structures while drilling illustrates this gray area.
Obviously, when the MODU is anchored, it is still a ship,
but how deep must the drilling be for the vessel-to-
structure conversion to happen? At what point does drilling
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start? At anchor or when the drill touches the seabed?
Although these seem rather esoteric and pedantic questions,
they illustrate the possibility, however remote, of
divergent opinions in this determination.
The previous analysis outlines the present state of the
law. Chapter Five will conclude the MOB should be
considered a warship under international law to most
accurately reflect the state of the law and retain the most
flexible position for the United States regarding the
implementation of a MOB.
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V. ARGUMENT AND CONCLUSION.
The general purpose of the following arguments is to
plumb the depths and limits of UNCLOS and international law
regarding the placement of an MOB regardless of the intended
use. These arguments may not be diplomatically prudent or
even realistic positions for the US government to consider.
The purpose is to define the limits within which policy may
be formulated. For example, how close to a coastal state
can an MOB be anchored before the United States must
unequivocally submit to the coastal nation's demands?
The crucial problem is the probable reduction of access
to overseas bases, whether by political, economic, or any
one of myriad reasons. This reduction of access will
seriously degrade the ability of the United States to
implement its historical policies of defending democracy,
presence, and expanding liberal economies. The government
is studying different and cost-effective ways to ensure US
military forces are able to continue to carry out these
policies. The TABO study was a seminal investigation that
explored existing and future technology that could possibly
solve the problem of reduced access to bases overseas. Of
the six overall areas of technology examined, the mobile
offshore base concept was chosen as a "first priority"
development for DARPA. In response to the DARPA finding and
significant JROC discussion, a Mission Needs Statement was
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issued from the JROC, and detailed commercial and
governmental comment and research have begun regarding this
proposed solution to the overseas base access problem. ^-^^
The question then becomes, what is the MOB in its present
configuration - a ship or something else? If a ship, is it
a warship or a merchant vessel? If it is something else, is
it an artificial island, an installation or a structure?
As concluded in Chapter IV, a structure or artificial
island can best be thought of as a lighthouse built on a
man-made mound of earth above the high water mark. In the
absence of clear treaty guidance, the legally persuasive
argument is the MOB is not a structure or an installation
within Article 60 of the Treaty, and as such, is exempt from
control by the coastal state except for resource
exploitation interference reasons.
Before beginning the formal argument section, it is
prudent to quickly acknowledge and discuss the relatively
extensive body of opinion regarding the military use of the
seabed for weapons, detection, and communications devices. -^^^
It is important to distinguish the MOB situation from the
coverage of these treaties, because if the MOB was to be
considered a weapon or detection or communication device.
133 See note 15
.
134 A leading discussion on this topic is between Tullio Treves, Military
Installations, Structures and Devices on the Seabed, 74 American Journal of
International Law 808, (1980) and Rex J. Zedalis, Military Installations,
Structures, and Devices on the Continental Shelf: A Response, 75 American Journal
of International Law 926, (1980)
.
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its placement would be governed by the relevant treaties not
UNCLOS . This discussion can be distinguished from the MOB
situation in two critical ways. First, the MOB is concerned
with the superjacent water column and not the seabed,
therefore not covered by the terms of the treaty. The
Seabed Treaty limits placement of devices only on the
seabed. -"-^^
Second, the MOB is not a weapon or detection and
communication device per se. Although the MOB will
undoubtedly have weapons and detection and communications
devices upon it, in this manner, it is functionally no
different than any ship anchoring on the high seas. If the
weapons placement, detection, and communication devices
treaties do not apply, the only remaining limit to the MOB's
placement arises under the UNCLOS regime.
A. UNCLOS REGIME.
1. Territorial Sea.
Since a coastal state has sovereignty over the
territorial sea limited only by the right of innocent
passage, a reasonable conclusion is the United States may
not anchor a MOB within 12 NM of a coastal nation without
the coastal state's permission. Since UNCLOS does not limit
the existing doctrine of innocent passage, there is.
'^^The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor, 23 UST 701, entered
into force. May 18, 1972.
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presumably nothing to limit the right of innocent passage of
an MOB through a coastal state's territorial sea.
The situation is not significantly altered if the focus
of MOB activity is centered upon a third state, not the
coastal state. If the MOB is anchored well within the
territorial sea of Country Orange, for example. Country
Green does not have a cause of action under UNCLOS to force
the relocation of the US MOB. Of course, realistic
determinations of relations between countries need to be
considered before placing a coastal nation in a sensitive
political position, and all Orange/Green treaty obligations
must not be hindered. For example, placing a MOB in the
Omani EEZ could possibly alienate Oman from other Arab
nations to the detriment of U.S. -Omani relations. This is
not to argue for an expanded understanding of coastal state
rights in the EEZ, but rather to point out the effects such
a unilateral decision may have on a U.S. ally.
2. Contiguous Zone.
The contiguous zone is the first area of "friction" for
possible MOB placement. Although the area beyond 12 NM is
open to all nations, the coastal state may limit actions in
the zone to prevent customs, immigration, fiscal, or
sanitary law violations in the coastal state or territorial
sea. If the United States places a MOB in a coastal state's
contiguous zone with the intention of some military,
surveillance, or peaceful (e.g., humanitarian relief) action
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in that country, the coastal state could argue that the
presence of the MOB violates one of the four areas of
coastal state control. The best argument and most realistic
situation is if the MOB can be shown, or even alleged, to
have violated the sanitary laws of the coastal nation. US
MOB generated pollution in the territorial sea, no matter
how slight, would mandate moving the MOB outside the coastal
state's contiguous zone or, at a minimum, solving the
problem at the source of the pollution.
If the MOB is anchored in the contiguous zone of
Country Orange, and the activity is focused on Country
Green, the clearest parallel is the territorial sea
argument. If there is no violation of the coastal state's
laws, and Country Orange does not eject the MOB, Country
Green has no UNCLOS causes of action to force MOB
relocation. Again, real world politics and obligations must
be considered prior to MOB placement.
3. EEZ.
The EEZ represents the first significant departure from
traditional division between the territorial seas and the
high seas. As argued earlier, historically all waters
seaward of the contiguous zone were high seas. UNCLOS
established a regime wherein the coastal state may exercise
sovereign control in the EEZ in three general areas: (1)
living resources. (2) non-living resources, and (3)
structures, marine research, and environmental preservation.
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However, "[sjtates simply never agreed to abandon such
rights (naval maneuvers and exercises within the EEZ) in all
the semi-enclosed areas of the world, including all those
bordering Europe and Arabia. "-^^^
If a MOB were placed in an EEZ and the coastal state
complained of interference with its management of the living
resources of the EEZ, it would be prudent for the United
States to consider moving the MOB during the subsequent
dispute resolution procedures. Living resources mean the
control of fish stocks and catch limits in the EEZ. if the
United States wished to challenge the claim of the coastal
state, there are four general avenues of dispute resolution.
a. Dispute Resolution Procedures.
First, there are the normal diplomatic methods of
dispute resolution between nation-states. Second, Part XV
of the Treaty concerns dispute resolution. As set forth in
most international agreements, all parties agree to settle
disputes by peaceful means. -^^"^ It should be noted at this
point that the coastal state has the right to ''''board,
inspect, and. . . arrest" vessels to ensure conformity with
UNCLOS and their sovereign management of the EEZ.^^^
Mitigating against this argument is the general grant of
immunity for warships and government ships operated for non-




commercial purpose have under UNCLOS.-^-^^ Under Article 280,
the contentious states may agree to their own method of
peaceful dispute resolution.
Third, in the event the nations cannot agree on an
alternative resolution mechanism or the chosen forum is
unsuccessful, either nation may invite Article 284
Conciliation procedures. If both nations agree on
Conciliation, Annex V provides detailed procedures for
Conciliation Board selection and management. The
Conciliators are required to provide a written report, with
their findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
Secretary-General and parties within 12 months of
convening. -^^^ It is important to note that the findings of
the Conciliators are not binding on either party. -^^-^
Finally, if no adequate amicable solution can be
found, one nation may submit a compulsory claim under
Article 286.^^^ Any party to the claim may submit the
dispute to ^'the proper tribunal" having jurisdiction. ^^^
Article 287 allows a nation to choose a dispute resolution
tribunal when the treaty is ^'signed, ratified, or acceded
to... or anytime thereafter." The practical effect of this
'""Annex V, Article 7(1).
'"'Annex V, Article 7(2).
'"^The title of this section under Part XV Settlement Dispute, Section 2
,
including article 286, is Compulsory Procedures Involving Binding Decisions.
'"^Article 287(1) confers upon any of the four tribunals in Article 286 a general
grant of jurisdiction if the countries can only agree to one tribunal. If the
countries cannot agree on a tribunal, the dispute is adjudicated under Annex VII
Arbitration procedures (Article 286(5)).
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article is to allow the parties to select one of the four
approved tribunals for compulsory adjudication of their
dispute. The four tribunals are: (1) the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (established by Annex VI),
(2) the International Court of Justice, (3) an arbitral
tribunal established under Annex VII and, (4) a special
arbitral tribunal under Annex VIII.
Annex VII, Arbitration, is a binding, final
decision made by a 5-person panel selected by the parties to
the dispute. Annex VIII, Special Arbitration, has a
specific charter of jurisdiction for issues relating to:
''"(1) fisheries, (2) protection and preservation of the
marine environment, (3) marine scientific research, and (4)
navigation, including pollution from vessels and
dumping [.] "^^^ The Special Arbitration decision is also a
binding, final decision from a 5-person panel selected by
the parties to the dispute.
The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding
discussion is that UNCLOS outlines a very specific chain of
dispute resolution procedures. The common thread of logic
running through the entire process is the promise and
commitment to settle all disputes peacefully. The process
starts with normal diplomatic measures, to include
everything from the exchange of Ambassadors to the "good
'^"Annex VIII, Article 1.
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offices'' of the United Nations or a third nation.
Secondly, the nations resort to voluntary and non-
binding Conciliation. Finally, upon failure of the
voluntary option or at the request of one of the countries,
the dispute may be submitted to compulsory jurisdiction and
a binding decision at the hands of one of the four tribunals
outlined in Article 287. The availability of these
differing tribunals, all with a general grant of
jurisdiction, allows for a certain degree of ^foruiti
shopping' by the disputing nations. The desired result may
be pre-ordained by selection of a certain tribunal over
another. For example, the 5-person Arbitration panels may
be perceived as more informed regarding UNCLOS issues than
the 15-person International Court of Justice (ICJ)
.
Conversely, if the opposite result is desired, the ICJ may
be selected. Or the nations may not be able to agree on
five people for a panel forcing the ICJ to decide the issue.
At this point, the process is a function of who sits on
which board and will that person be sympathetic to any
nation's claim.
b. Factual Standard of Proof.
At the end of fisheries management dispute
resolution process discussion, the crux of the dispute was a
factual issue. Does the MOB, as a matter of fact, interfere
with the coastal states' management of fish populations, or
is the coastal state's claim merely a ''Trojan Horse" to
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expand its sovereign jurisdiction over the EEZ? This is the
elemental question any tribunal will need to address when
adjudicating an UNCLOS dispute. The coastal state should be
able to show actual interference with fisheries management
(declining populations, reduced catches, etc.) or, at the
minimum, a plan for fisheries management that pre-dates
placement of the MOB. There is no standard of
reasonableness in the language of the Treaty, so the coastal
state may argue that any interference, no matter how
unreasonable, justifies its insistence to move the MOB. The
best response to this claim refers back to Articles 61-68.
The coastal state must take into account all factors when
making resource decisions. For example, in Article 61(2)
the coastal state must use the '''best scientific evidence" to
prevent over-exploitation. Article 62(1) requires the
coastal state to promote "optimum utilization" of the
resources without "prejudice to Article 61." This language
can be argued to create a "reasonableness" standard in fish
stock management cases. The language, tone and spirit of
the document all argue for a general reasonable approach to
all UNCLOS issues, not only fisheries disputes. ^^^
The non-living asset management grant of coastal
state jurisdiction in the EEZ follows the same dispute
resolution framework and factual issue determination process
'"^D.P. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1, {Clarendon: Oxford,
1982) pp. 57-58.
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as the living resource analysis. If the coastal nation
objects to the MOB because it allegedly interferes with the
coastal state's management of non-living resources, it
becomes a factual determination paralleling the living asset
arguments to be solved within the dispute resolution
framework.
The more difficult and potentially litigious issue
concerns the third grant of coastal state jurisdiction in
the EEZ regarding structures, marine research, and
environmental preservation. Article 60 grants the coastal
state the ^'^exclusive right" to construct, authorize, and
regulate the construction and operation of artificial
islands, installations and structures within the EEZ. The
contentious issue becomes whether the MOB is an artificial
island, structure, installation, or ship.
Given the present state of the law, it would be
very difficult for a coastal state to prove jurisdiction
over the MOB on the grounds that the MOB constitutes an
artificial island, structure, or installation constructed
for extractive purposes in the EEZ.
4. Continental Shelf.
The Continental Shelf arguments mirror the EEZ, except
that the coastal state has less jurisdiction regarding
waters of the area. The coastal state may exercise control
over the seabed of the continental shelf but not the
superjacent waters. This removes the ability of the coastal
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state to force movement of the MOB for fisheries management
reasons. All grants of authority are the same as the EEZ
with the same arguments and counter-arguments.
5. High Seas.
MOB deployment on the high seas would only be
restrained by the "due regard" provisions of Article 87(2) .
The high seas are ostensibly reserved for peaceful purposes,
but Oxman makes a persuasive argument that the admonition in
Article 88-^^^ is primarily aspirational and that nothing was
intended to limit past practice of warships on the high
seas.-^^^ The intent was to protect the freedom of military
action on the high seas and not to limit it. The most
notable feature of UNCLOS regarding warships is that there
is nothing surprisingly new.^^^ Even if the United Nations
were to eventually add substance and enforcement mechanisms
to this article, the MOB would still be beyond the reach of
UNCLOS. The three presence functions (logistics hub, nation
building, and humanitarian support) discussed in Chapter III
would likely be well within the peaceful definitions of
Article 86. The other three functions (force projection,
forward operating base, and deep attack and strike) concern
laws of war and would be subject to the terms of future
UNCLOS modifications.
The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes,
""oxman, Regime, pp. 930-833; See also Truver, 2010, p. 1242,
'"^Ibid, p. 861.
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B. Ship or Structure?
The most useful tool for this determination is the
"totality of circumstances"' test outlined in Chapter IV.
Using that analysis, the MOB is more like a ship than a
structure. Although it does not look like the traditional
concept of a ship, it is designed and used for water travel,
has propulsion (or possible of being towed) , displaces
water, has a rudder, and does not permanently attach itself
to the seabed. The United States could add features to
support the conclusion that the MOB is a ship. The MOB
would likely display ship lights and day shapes in
accordance with 72 COLREGS, and be subject to normal
maritime risk.
An MOB anchored beyond a coastal state' s contiguous
zone is clearly not an artificial island placed on man-
deposited seabed above the high water mark. Nor should it
be argued that the MOB is a structure or installation under
UNCLOS . The very advantage of the MOB, i.e., mobility (no
matter how slow) , distinguishes it from a structure under
UNCLOS and customary law, and from an installation that is
characterized by permanent attachment to the seabed.
The next issue is whether the MOB is a vessel operated
by a government for non-commercial purposes or a warship.
To preserve the widest grant of freedom of action and to
support the conclusion that the MOB is a ship, the United
States should consider the MOB a ship under UNCLOS Article
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29. The MOB should fly the US flag, be commanded by a
commissioned officer (of any branch, not necessarily Navy)
,
and be manned by a crew under military discipline. Although
a government ship operated for commercial purposes has the
same grant of immunity as a warship, clear warship
identification would preclude any questions as to the MOB's
actual status. Since the government ship for non-commercial
purposes is a new category, it would be prudent to plan for
the clearest and most precise definition.
As has been shown, the MOB can be thought of as a non-
traditional type of ship, but a ship nonetheless. The most
advantageous way for the United States to treat the MOB is
as a warship. The ship status permits relatively
unencumbered placement of the MOB beyond the contiguous zone
of any coastal State. Any disputes regarding MOB placement
have specific and well-defined, peaceful dispute resolution
procedures. In conclusion, the MOB is ship and can be
anchored anywhere a traditional appearing ship may legally
anchor.
This conclusion may have far-ranging implications for
strategic planners and CinCs. The foreknowledge that an MOB
may be anchored anywhere beyond the 12 mile contiguous zone
instead of beyond the 200 mile EEZ significantly affects how
a operation may be planned and conducted. For example,
instead of depending on constant aircraft carrier presence
in the Arabian Gulf, an MOB in the area would solve the US
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force presence requirement without depending on a host
country for permission to conduct operations from that
country. This critical determination significantly expands
the realm of options for planners and Commanders.
Additionally, a well-reasoned and sensible
international legal position adopted by the United States,
enhances the credibility of UNCLOS and the industrial
nations. By considering UNCLOS, the United States displays
a commitment to the validity of international law and
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Mobile Offshore Bases
MOBILE OFFSHORE BASES (MOBs)
Primary Missions
Forward projection of U.S. deterrent capability
Preposition combat equipment/materiel afloat
unencumbered by sovereignty issues
Relocatable multi-mission logistics support
base afloat
• Air cargo operations up to
C- 130 aircraft
• KC- 1 30 aircraft for in-flight refueling
capability
• Cargo transfer capability for Ro-Ro,
break bulk, container and POL
• Maintenance/repair facility
Characteristics
Semi-submersible modules each 500 feet long;
300 feet wide; 213 feet high
Six-module system equates to over 2.7 miUion
usable square feet of environmentally controlled
storage area
Dry and liquid cargo storage areas are mutually
exclusive
At-sea connect/disconnect modules
Propulsion for orientation/relocation up to
10 knots
Survivable in all sea states
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